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INTRODUCTION 
Granting standing based on the ephemeral "Butterfly Effect" would of course be 
improper. But this case is not about butterflies in Brazil affecting weather in Kansas. It 
is about one property owner building a bridge that may cause or contribute to flood-
related damage on his neighbors' properties. This Court's jurisprudence strongly 
supports standing in cases like this involving a real risk of harm to person or property. A 
host of federal decisions - which Mclntyre has declined to engage much less distinguish 
- likewise demonstrate that, even under the narrower constraints of Article III, standing 
would be appropriate here. The risks at issue in this case are real and present, not 
ephemeral. In fact, the precise event the Neighbors fear occurred only 25 years ago. 
(R. 5, 84.) Whether the Neighbors will ultimately prevail on the merits is unknowable 
and irrelevant at this stage. They have standing to bring their claims and deserve a fair 
opportunity to prove their case. 
REPLY TO MCINTYRE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a motion to dismiss where the allegations in the complaint 
are the undisputed operative facts. Accordingly, Mclntyre properly "concedes the 
Neighbors' statement of facts is correct." Brief of Appellees ("Aplee. Br."), at 6. But 
Mclntyre also repeatedly challenges the well-pleaded averments in the complaint, 
invokes facts that are not in the record at all, and makes arguments as though this matter 
were decided on the merits below. The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing or 
make any factual findings. The dismissal was based solely on the pleadings and the 
attached documents. 
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Mclntyre's factual additions are mainly arguments about the legal effects of 
various documents or facts. First, in an attempt to reframe the issue, Mclntyre has 
recharacterized the permit issued by the Division. He asserts that the "Neighbors' 
statement that Mclntyre obtained a permit from the Division to build a bridge is a 
misstatement" because (he argues) while the permit "was required operationally" it did 
not "of itself. . . allow the building of a bridge" but only the "temporary disturbance of 
Little Cottonwood Creek during construction of the bridge's abutments." Aplee. Br., at 
6. The bridge itself, he says, is outside the creek's channels. This is contrary to the well-
pleaded allegations in the Complaint. It is also wrong. 
To clarify, there are two relevant documents in the record - the application and the 
permit itself. On August 21, 2006, Mclntyre filed an application to Alter a Natural 
Stream Channel pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29(1). (R. 10-11.) The application 
was for a "project" Mclntyre described simply as "Bridge across Little Cottonwood 
Creek." (R. 10.) "Little Cottonwood Creek" was listed as the "Watercourse to be 
altered." {Id.) The purpose of the "project" was stated as "Ingress and Egress to property 
on both sides of Little Cottonwood Creek." {Id.) Notably, Mclntyre listed the Neighbors 
(the Browns and Sorensons) as "adjacent property owners . . . or other individuals who 
may be affected by this project." (R. 11.) 
On October 11, 2006, the Division issued a "Stream Channel Alteration Permit 
Number 06-57-29SA to construct a bridge over Little Cottonwood Creek . . . . " (R. 38.) 
The permit imposes conditions on various construction-related activities. {Id.) The 
permit also saddles Mclntyre with post-construction obligations. Most notably, it 
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requires that "[d]uring high water events, the bridge must be monitored to allow for 
debris passage." {Id.) The permit further requires that, "[t]o avoid proliferation of bridge 
crossings," Mclntyre must consider "allowing others to utilize the bridge, provided they 
adequately compensate you for a portion of the cost of bridge construction and gain a 
legal right-of-way." {Id.) Thus, the permit was both necessary for Mclntyre to build the 
bridge and also continues to impose obligations on him with respect to the bridge's 
operation.1 
Mclntyre states that because the Neighbors do not allege ownership of property 
"adjoining" {i.e., immediately connected to) Little Cottonwood Creek or on the first level 
flood plain, "flooding and erosion caused by the Creek would never directly impact 
Neighbors' properties." Aplee. Br., at 7. This assertion improperly contradicts the 
alleged facts and is one of many examples where Mclntyre tries to litigate the merits of 
the Neighbors' case. The complaint alleges that inundation of "the first level flood plains 
on both sides of the stream in the vicinity of the bridge" will result in "significant erosion 
and damage to the [Neighbors] and other property owners adjacent to the bridge." (R. 5-
6.) Whether the Neighbors' properties directly about the flood plain is not addressed by 
the pleadings and is irrelevant. The Neighbors' allegation is that flooding caused or 
exacerbated by Mclntyre's bridge could erode or undermine property upon which their 
own properties depend for physical support. (R. 5-6.) In its own review of the pleadings, 
the Court of Appeals recognized that the Neighbors had alleged a direct impact: "We 
1
 Whether or not Mclntyre is correct that the bridge's "abutments are entirely upon 
property owned by Mclntyre and lie outside the Creek's channel" (Aplee. Br., at 6) -
perhaps an issue of fact for the merits - the fact remains that the permit continues to 
impose obligations on Mclntyre in respect to his bridge. 
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acknowledge that the complaint does assert some actual facts suggesting that a flood or 
high water flows would cause harm to Plaintiffs' property. . . . Indeed, the engineer's 
report attached to the complaint shows a danger of possible damage to Plaintiffs' 
property if Little Cottonwood Creek's water flows reach the same levels that they did in 
1984." Op., T| 14 (emphasis added). 
Mclntyre quotes a portion of the State Engineer's response to the Neighbors' 
request for reconsideration opining that "'the natural condition of the stream is not being 
affected by the construction of this bridge. No part of the structure is in the stream 
channel.'" Aplee. Br., at 7 (quoting R. 89). But the statement Mclntyre quotes is 
incomplete, giving the false impression that the bridge will have no impact on the 
stream's capacity. The entire paragraph confirms that in the view of the State Engineer 
the bridge will alter the stream channel's hydraulics under certain circumstances: 
This office concludes that the natural condition of the stream is not being 
affected by the construction of this bridge. No part of the structure is in the 
stream channel, so, consequently the channel hydraulics are not changed 
until the water level reaches the bottom of the bridge, which is located at 
elevation 4319. The FEMA flood map, effective September 21, 2001, 
indicates the 100-year flood elevation at this location is elevation 4318. 
We deem this to be a reasonable impact to the channel's capacity. 
(R. 89 (emphasis added).) Whether this assessment is factually accurate and whether the 
State Engineer's conclusion that the impact on the stream is "reasonable" are contested 
issues pertaining to the merits of this action. In all events, it does nol suggest the bridge 
will have no impact on the stream. 
Mclntyre notes that the Secor Report describes significant erosion that is already 
occurring "even without the bridge" and that "'building the bridge only increases the 
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risk"' of further erosion. Aplee. Br., at 7-8 (quoting R. 25-26). That, of course, is 
precisely the Neighbors' point: the bridge increases the risk of flooding and erosion in 
this highly sensitive area, which threatens their properties and wellbeing. 
Lastly, Mclntyre asserts that the now-constructed bridge has a "removable deck" 
and that "Secor's opinion on [the damning effect of the bridge] requires an inference that 
Mclntyre will fail to fulfill his duty to keep the bridge clear of debris or remove the 
deck." Aplee. Br., at 8. The complaint contains no allegations or information about how 
easily or quickly - if at all - such a deck could be removed in the event of a flood. In 
argument before the trial court, Mclntyre asserted - without citation to evidence - that 
the deck of the bridge "is designed to be placed on its footings with a crane and bolted in 
place" and thus could be removed "in an emergency" by lifting it "off the footings and 
set[ting] [it] to the side until the high water subsides . . . ." (R. 113-14.) At this early 
stage, there is nothing in the record about whether Mclntyre has such a crane always 
available and whether it could be used quickly and effectively enough to avert flood 
damage. These unsupported assertions go to the merits of the case - especially to remedy 
issues. Ironically, though, the argument concedes that the bridge does indeed increase the 
risk of flooding, which is the very reason it has to be removable. 
ARGUMENT 
"Mclntyre does not dispute [the] Neighbors' extensive recitation of the underlying 
history and policy of Utah's standing requirement in general." Aplee. Br., at 19. That 
review showed that Utah standing law is primarily concerned with protecting the 
separation of powers by ensuring that the plaintiff has a "'personal stake in the outcome 
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of the legal dispute'" rather than a generalized public grievance. Brief of Appellants 
("Br. Apps."), at 16-17 (quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)). 
Mclntyre cannot claim that standing in this lawsuit between close neighbors implicates 
such concerns. Nor does he dispute that potential injury can give rise to standing or that 
increased risk itself can be a cognizable harm. See Aplee. Br., at 19, 27. The Neighbors 
demonstrated that federal courts often find standing in cases involving probabilistic 
injuries even when the probabilities are small. See Br. Apps, at 22-30. Mclntyre does 
not disagree and makes no effort to defend the flawed federal-law analysis that was 
central to the decision below. 
These serious concessions on the law leave Mclntyre with little room to maneuver. 
He argues for the first time that, regardless of injury, the Neighbors' claims are not 
redressable. He denies causation with an argument that attempts to finely parse and 
weigh the allegations, as if the issue had gone to trial rather than being decided on the 
pleadings. He claims that the Sorensons cannot be injured because flooding caused by 
the bridge would never physically reach their property, ignoring the fact that flood waters 
could directly undermine land on which the Sorensons' property depends for support. 
And he makes the novel argument that his own willingness to remove the bridge deck in 
the event of high water should weigh heavily in the analysis. None of these arguments 
demonstrate lack of standing. Whatever their value as arguments on the merits, they have 
no place in the standing analysis. 
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I. THIS COURT AFFORDS NO DEFERENCE TO THE DECISION BELOW 
AND THE OPERATIVE FACTS ARE THOSE IN THE COMPLAINT. 
At various points in his brief, Mclntyre suggests that this Court owes deference to 
the decisions below. See, e.g., Aplee. Br., at 20-21. That is incorrect. Mclntyre raised 
the standing issue on a motion to dismiss and it was decided as such. Thus, the facts of 
this case are the allegations in the pleadings. See Br. Apps., at 15-16. At no time did the 
trial court make factual findings or determinations to which an appellate court might owe 
deference. Whether standing exists under an undisputed set of facts is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness on appeal. See CME v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 34, f^ 12. 
Mclntyre suggests the trial court's denial of the Neighbors' motion for TRO during an in 
camera "hearing" is significant. See Aplee. Br., at 3. Not so. The trial court neither 
made nor was procedurally authorized to make factual findings in that setting. It merely 
denied the motion, and that denial is entitled to no weight on appeal. 
Mclntyre attempts to undermine the allegations in the complaint by claiming they 
are not supported by the attached exhibits. Aplee. Br., at 20-21. As the opening brief 
amply demonstrates, the two Secor Reports strongly support standing. See Br. Apps., at 
Mclntyre relies on Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, J^ 9, for his factual-deference argument 
(Aplee. Br., at 21), but the case actually supports the Neighbors' position. Jones 
involved a custody dispute between a biological mother and her former domestic partner. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on various issues. On appeal, this Court 
limited its analysis to the former domestic partner's standing under the in loco parentis 
doctrine. Since that analysis turned on undisputed facts, obviating the need to inquire 
into facts determined in the evidentiary hearing, this Court's review gave no deference to 
the court below: "Because we confine our review to the district court's interpretation of 
the doctrine of in loco parentis and do not address its findings of fact or application of 
those facts to the law, the appropriate standard of review is correctness. We therefore 
grant no discretion to the district court." Id As a pleadings case, the facts here are 
likewise undisputed and no deference is owed the lower courts. 
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8, 31-32. But there are two additional points. First, the Neighbors attached to the 
complaint both parties' submissions to the Division, which, although not required, was 
entirely appropriate under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(2)(a). They did not, however, 
adopt that record wholesale nor claim it as the entire proof of their case. Hence, the 
attachments are supportive and provide useful context for the pleadings, but they do not 
trump the pleadings. The trial court's review of the Division's decision is "by trial de 
novo" governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence. See id. § 63G-4-
402. The Neighbors have every right to develop and present additional evidence on 
issues like injury, causation, and appropriate remedies. Second, the Secor Reports 
themselves are only preliminary analyses. The report of September 18, 2006, 
recommends that "a complete engineering study be undertaken to evaluate these risks." 
R. 26; Add-32. The report of October 30, 2006 admitted to being based on the limited 
information available in Mclntyre's own permit application "along with readily available 
data on the creek." R. 78. Again, the complaint references these reports as context for 
their allegations but does not adopt them as the only evidence to be presented in the case. 
II. THE NEIGHBORS' CLAIMS ARE REDRESSABLE. 
Mclntyre contends that the Neighbors lack standing because their claims are not 
redressable. He argues that because he quickly built his bridge despite the pendency of 
this lawsuit, the permit is now essentially a nullity that cannot be reversed or modified, 
and thus his decision to construct the bridge is essentially unreviewable. In Utah Chapter 
of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. {"Sierra Club"), 2006 UT 74, f 29, the permit 
had continuing relevance and thus could be challenged, but here (according to Mclntyre) 
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the Neighbors have no relief because the permit has expired. See Aplee. Br., at 12-14. 
This new argument fails for numerous reasons. 
1. First and foremost, it is well established that "'[sjtanding is determined as 
of the time the action is brought.'" CME, 2009 UT 34, \ 8 (quoting Nova Health Sys. v. 
Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2005)); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 569 n.4 (1992) (standing to be "assessed under the facts existing when the 
complaint is filed"). Contrary to Mclntyre's argument, the redressability analysis looks 
not to current facts but to the facts as they existed when the Neighbors first sued. 
The Neighbors brought this action on December 15, 2006, shortly after the 
Division issued its final decision on November 17, 2006 denying their objection. (R. 1, 
4, 89.) Among other things, the complaint sought de novo review of the Division's 
decision issuing the permit, stay of the approval, an injunction against Mclntyre 
restraining him "from constructing the bridge in the area in question," and "such other 
and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances." (R. 6-8.) At the time, Mclntyre had yet to construct his bridge, the 
permit as characterized by Mclntyre was unquestionably operative, and the injury 
complained of was fully redressable by the relief sought. That is enough for standing. 
2. At any rate, Mclntyre's redressability argument is premised on a 
mischaracterization of the permit. As related above, the permit application was for a 
"project" which Mclntyre denominated as "Bridge across Little Cottonwood Creek" - not 
just for construction of the bridge. (R. 10.) The purpose of the "project" was not only to 
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build a bridge but to maintain it as a permanent structure providing "Ingress and Egress 
to property on both sides of Little Cottonwood Creek." {Id.) 
Completion of construction did not end the permit's legal existence or relevance. 
To this day the permit imposes continuing obligations on Mclntyre. In apparent response 
to concerns raised by the Neighbors, the State Engineer fashioned the permit to require 
Mclntyre to monitor the bridge during high water periods to ensure that it does not trap 
debris and to consider allowing others to use the bridge so as to avoid construction of 
additional bridges. (R. 38, % 3; id. \ 4.) 
State statutes contemplate that permits like Mclntyre's may contain on-going 
obligations rather than merely authorizing a single construction event. Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-29(4)(c) states that "[t]he state engineer may approve the application [to relocate a 
natural stream channel or alter the beds and banks of a natural stream], in whole or in 
part, with any reasonable terms to protect vested water rights, any public recreational use, 
the natural stream environment, or aquatic wildlife." Section 73-2-25(2) permits the 
State Engineer to bring an enforcement action if he finds that a person "violates an order 
issued under Section 73-3-29 regarding the alteration of the bed or bank of a natural 
stream channel." Should Mclntyre violate the conditions of the permit - say, by failing 
to monitor debris passage during high-water periods - there is no doubt the State 
Engineer could bring an enforcement action to compel compliance. 
Thus, Mclntyre's description of the permit as a legal nullity that cannot be 
challenged is inaccurate. Mclntyre's bridge continues to exist and operate subject to the 
permit's terms, similar to the power plant in Sierra Club. If the Neighbors prevail on the 
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merits of this action, the equitable relief the trial court may properly grant would include 
additional permit terms requiring Mclntyre to take further measures to better mitigate 
flood risks. Even under Mclntyre's mistaken view of redressability, the claims in the 
Neighbors' complaint are still redressable. 
3. The Neighbors have challenged the permit as unlawful and have a right to 
de novo review of its issuance and terms. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402. If the 
permit is truly as narrow as Mclntyre argues, then it was defective for that reason as well. 
If accurate, Mclntyre's cramped description of the permit is yet another basis for 
challenging the Division's action rather than a reason for denying standing. 
4. Mclntyre's redressability argument is really a misnamed and undeveloped 
mootness argument. "But questions of standing and questions of mootness are distinct, 
and it is important to treat them separately." Becker v. Federal Election Com'n, 230 F.3d 
381 (1st Cir. 2000). Mclntyre raised a mootness argument below, but the Court of 
Appeals properly rejected it. The court reasoned: 
Defendants argue on appeal that Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief is 
now moot because the bridge has already been built. Given our decision on 
the standing issue, we do not need to address this issue. Still, we recognize 
that Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction prior to the bridge's construction while Mclntyre's 
Motion to Dismiss was being considered. Because Plaintiffs took active 
measures to prevent the construction of the bridge and because we have the 
authority to restore the status quo by ordering the bridge removed, 
Plaintiffs' appeal on that issue is not moot. See Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 
246, 251, 66 S.Ct. 1096, 90 L.Ed. 1199 (1946) ("It has long been 
established that where a defendant with notice in an injunction proceeding 
completed the acts sought to be enjoined the court may by mandatory 
injunction restore the status quo."). 
Op. , t l5n .2 . 
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The Court of Appeals' reasoning on this point was sound. Mootness arises when 
essentially no relief can be granted due to a change in circumstances during the litigation. 
"An issue on appeal is considered moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect 
the rights of the litigants." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). This case is nowhere near moot. Because Mclntyre had notice 
of this injunction action but proceeded to build his bridge anyway, on remand the trial 
court would have the authority to restore the status quo, as the United States Supreme 
Court stated in Porter, 328 U.S. at 251. See also Columbus Board of Zoning Appeals v. 
Wether aid, 605 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ind. App. 1992) (party "proceeded to build [a 
restaurant] at his own peril prior to a final resolution" of land use issues). 
Moreover, the Neighbors have requested relief beyond enjoining construction of 
the bridge or revoking the permit. To guard against unforeseen changes in the facts, they 
requested "such other and ftirther legal and equitable relief as this Court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances." (R. at 8.) Rule 54(c)(1) allows the district court to 
grant appropriate relief "even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
And "equity cases afford courts discretion and latitude in fashioning equitable remedies." 
Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, *|24. Courts may fashion injunctions appropriate to the 
circumstances. See id. 1) 26 ("Equitable remedies . . . are distinguished by their 
flexibility, their unlimited variety, and their adaptability to circumstances.") (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
Although the Neighbors view removal of the bridge as the most appropriate 
remedy, it is not the only possible remedy. After weighing the merits following further 
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factual development about the degree of risk involved and other matters, the trial court 
might enter a more limited injunction requiring Mclntyre to remove the bridge deck 
during times of high-flood risk. It might order the bridge altered. It might order 
Mclntyre to fund reinforcement of the escarpment so as to protect the Browns' property. 
This case remains a live controversy because the trial court may fashion these and other 
equitable remedies to protect the Neighbors' interests. a[I]n deciding a mootness issue, 
the question is not whether the precise relief sought at the time the application for an 
injunction was filed is still available. The question is whether there can be any effective 
relief." Northwest Envtl Defense Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(case not moot where plaintiffs asked court "to grant such other equitable relief as it 
deemed necessary"). The trial court on remand will have many avenues of effective 
relief to consider. This case is far from moot.3 
5. Lastly, the approach Mclntyre advocates is bad judicial policy. It would 
reward litigation delay tactics (such as frivolous standing challenges) designed to buy the 
defendant time to complete the challenged action. It would often preclude appellate 
courts from addressing lower-court decisions. The Legislature has provided for de novo 
review of orders of the State Engineer. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-402 and 73-3-14. 
But such review would be meaningless if speedy action by the defendant could moot the 
challenge. In fine, Mclntyre's approach would encourage hasty action on the ground and 
3
 The party claiming mootness bears a heavy burden. See id. at 1244 ("The burden of 
demonstrating mootness is a heavy one."). Mclntyre's belated, two-page redressability 
argument does not satisfy that burden. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (1988) ("A 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which [a] party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.") (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
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strategic delays in court, seriously undermining the authority and integrity of the judicial-
review process established by the Legislature. It should be rejected. 
III. THE NEIGHBORS HAVE ADEQUATELY PLEADED INJURY AND 
CAUSATION FOR PURPOSES OF STANDING. 
Mclntyre devotes the largest part of his brief to arguing that the Neighbors have 
failed to establish a "clear causal link" between the alleged injuries and the bridge. 
Aplee. Br., at 24; see id. at 15-19, 22-26. Faulting the Neighbors for "relyj'ing] on their 
pleadings," Mclntyre maintains that the lower courts were not "obliged to accept [the 
complaint's] conclusory allegations as true." Aplee. Br., at 23. He contends that the 
plaintiffs in Sierra Club properly established by affidavit a causal link between their 
alleged injuries and the power plant, whereas here no such link is shown by the allegedly 
"speculative" allegations in the complaint. See Aplee. Br., at 23, 25-26. 
Mclntyre's painstaking efforts to parse the facts and identify supposed evidentiary 
weaknesses in the Neighbors' case betrays a fundamental confusion in his argument 
about the difference between the minimalist standing inquiry and the requirements of 
prevailing on the merits. Standing does not mean a party wins the case. It does not mean 
a party even has a decent claim. It means only that the party has a sufficiently "personal 
stake in the outcome of the legal dispute" to ensure "a concrete factual context conducive 
to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action," as opposed to a 
"generalized grievance[] . . . more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive 
branches of the state government." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148-49 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). That description easily fits the Neighbors. Mclntyre himself listed the 
Neighbors as part of a small number of "adjacent property owners (immediately upstream 
14 
or downstream) or other individuals who may be affected by this project." (R. 11.) 
Nothing more was required in Jenkins, Sierra Club, or this Court's recent decision in 
CME. Nothing more is necessary here. 
A, The Neighbors Have Alleged an Adequate Causal Connection Between 
the Bridge and the Potential Injury. 
Mclntyre expends great effort arguing that the Neighbors have failed to show an 
adequate connection between the bridge and any potential injury. But "a plaintiff 
claiming standing under the traditional criteria does not need to prove causation to the 
same extent it will be required to prove it at trial." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 32. 'This 
court rarely imposes a requirement that a party prove its alleged harm, or even causation, 
to establish standing." CME, 2009 UT 34, % 12. The issue here is whether the Neighbors 
"have alleged a plausible connection between their injuries" and the challenged action. 
Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 32. The hurdle is low. At the pleading stage plaintiffs can 
simply allege "that they could prove causation" if given the chance: "that is all that is 
required at this phase." Id. 
The "plausible connection" in this case is straightforward. The Neighbors are 
adjacent property owners who allege that the bridge will (1) adversely alter the natural 
stream environment and (2) increase the risk of flood-related damage to their properties. 
(R. 4-6.) 
Mclntyre makes no effort to explain why the allegation that the bridge will 
adversely affect the natural stream environment - an important statutory factor the State 
Engineer was required to consider in deciding whether to grant the permit {see Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-29(4)(a)(iv)) - is insufficient for standing. The Neighbors enjoy and benefit 
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from the beautiful natural stream environment adjacent to their homes. The statement of 
facts in the opening brief- which Mclntyre "concedes . . . is correct" (Aplee. Br., at 6) -
states that "[i]n the event of flooding caused or exacerbated by the bridge, the natural 
stream environment will be adversely affected or destroyed." Br. Apps., at 7-8 (citing the 
complaint at R. 5). Mclntyre does not dispute this point. This uncontested causal 
connection is alone sufficient for standing. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-
35 (1972) (impairment of enjoyment of aesthetics can give rise to standing). 
Mclntyre argues that the bridge would never cause harm to the Neighbors. That, 
of course, is his primary defense to this lawsuit. But that is not what the complaint says. 
The complaint alleges that "the bridge and [its] access ramps will alter the stream's 
channel, and thereby diminish the natural channel's ability to conduct high water flows, 
heighten the potential for damming, and thereby increase the risk of flooding in the 
surrounding areas." (R. 5.) It alleges that if water "flows similar to those in 1984 are 
experienced in the stream channel (as altered by the construction of the approved bridge), 
the erosion could cause the stream banks to overflow and inundate the first level flood 
plains on both sides of the stream in the vicinity of the bridge. Such an event will cause 
significant erosion and damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the 
bridge." (R. 5-6 (emphasis added).) 
Mclntyre acknowledges that the Browns' property is already suffering from 
settling but argues that the evidence is unclear whether additional erosion of the 
escarpment that provides direct lateral support to their property would directly cause 
further property damage. Aplee. Br., at 22. He contends that even a bridge-caused flood 
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that further erodes the escarpment may not "have any impact on Brown's settling 
problem" and thus the causal link for standing is missing. Id; see also id at 23-24. 
Such detailed merits arguments have no place in the standing inquiry. Indeed, not 
even the high-threshold standing analysis of the majority below ventured that far into the 
thicket of the merits. The majority uacknowledge[d] that the complaint does assert some 
actual facts suggesting that a flood or high water flows would cause harm to Plaintiffs' 
property." Op., If 14 (emphasis added). The majority's concern was not causation but the 
fact that high-water events "are dictated by unknown weather patterns" that "may not 
occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all." Id\ 14 (quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
That said, the causal connection between the alleged risks created by the bridge 
and the injury to the Browns' property is evident. The Browns' property depends for 
lateral support on a steep slope (escarpment) near the stream. That slope is eroding. The 
Browns' property is experiencing harmful subsidence, likely caused by that erosion. And 
Mclntyre's bridge increases the risk of flooding that would further erode the escarpment 
and hence further undermine the lateral support on which the Browns' property depends. 
{See R. 66-67.) In short, Mclntyre's bridge could result in flooding that causes the 
Browns' property to collapse. Nothing in this Court's decisions remotely suggests that 
more detailed or particularized allegations or proof of causation are necessary merely to 
plead standing.4 
Mclntyre's reliance on York v. Unqualified Wash. County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 
679 (Utah 1986), demonstrates the weakness of his argument. Aplee. Br., at 23. In 
classic pro se litigation, the plaintiff in York sued various elected officials accusing them 
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Mclntyre spends an entire section of his brief arguing that the Sorensons lack 
standing because the complaint does not go into great detail about how a bridge-caused 
flood would affect their specific property. Aplee. Br., at 15-19. He faults the complaint's 
general allegations. Id. Yet standing doctrine does not require great particularity at the 
pleading stage. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 ("At the pleading stage, general factual 
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice [to establish 
standing], for on a motion to dismiss, [the court] presume[s] that general allegations 
embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim."). The Sorensons are 
among the "Plaintiffs" in this action and the complaint alleges that, on account of an 
increased risk of flooding, "construction of a bridge in this environmentally fragile area 
will result in irreparable harm and damage to the Plaintiffs and their property." (R. 6.) 
That is enough to establish causation at the pleading stage. 
The Secor Report (September 18, 2006) provides additional context. The 
Sorensons' property abuts the first-level flood plain. (R. 69; see also R. 124.) Apart 
from that buffer, a steep "river terrace slope [partly owned by the Sorensons] is in direct 
"of being unqualified to hold public office." Id. at 679. He amorphously alleged "that 
his legal rights (and those of all others of similar circumstance) are at jeopardy and he 
will be adversely affected unless the court acts immediately to protect him from the 
'unlawful acts of certain , . . county elected officials.'" Id. at 680. But he never provided 
any clue about what rights were at issue nor "reference to any specific facts that show any 
jeopardy, adverse impact, or injury." Id. Those were the types of "conclusory 
allegations" (id.) this Court rejected - not, contrary to Mclntyre's argument, because a 
complaint must have great factual detail to support each conclusion, but rather because 
the plaintiff in York failed to provide "any allegation or other indicia that [he], in fact, has 
a personal stake in this controversy." Id. (emphasis added). "Absent allegation or 
showing of specific injury or adverse impact which is causally related to the alleged 
illegal activity, York does not meet the traditional standing test." Id. A starker contrast 
with the Neighbors' detailed allegations would be hard to imagine. 
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contact with the Creek's channel," is made of "primarily fine sand and silt," and "is quite 
unstable unless vegetated" (R. 66.) Hence flooding of the first-level flood plain could 
undermine the structural integrity of the Sorensons' erosion-prone abutting property. 
And Mclntyre's bridge will increase the risk of flooding of the first-level flood plain.5 
Despite Mclntyre's lament, these are not "Butterfly Effect" arguments. See Aplee. 
Br., at 18-19, 30. The allegations in the complaint, reasonable inferences therefrom, and 
the additional context supplied by the attachments all establish an adequate and perfectly 
reasonable causal connection for standing purposes. Property does not exist suspended in 
midair. Each parcel is physically connected to another. Use of one property often affects 
the use and enjoyment of another, which is why land use laws exist. It takes no grand 
leap of logic, no implausible speculation, to conclude that flooding on Mclntyre's 
property due to the bridge could cause injury to the Neighbors' properties. Causation is 
established for purposes of standing. 
B. Mclntyre's Reliance on Sierra Club Is Misplaced; Sierra Club and This 
Court's Recent Standing Decision in CME Strongly Affirm Standing in 
Potential Injury Cases Like This, 
The Neighbors maintain that despite quoting the general Sierra Club standard, the 
majority below ignored the decision's specific application of that standard in the 
The pleading record does not allege the exact locations of the Neighbors' property lines. 
If flood waters have the potential of eroding away any portion of the Sorensons' property 
- however minor the erosion - then both injury and causation would automatically be 
established for purposes of standing. This Court has never required such a tight causal 
connection for standing, nor should it. But even if that were the standard, dismissal in 
this case would still be premature given the allegations of direct causation in the 
complaint. 
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potential- injury context and instead applied a higher standing threshold than either Sierra 
Club or federal law requires. See Br. Apps, at 9-10, 19-30. 
Mclntyre disagrees. He contends that "the decision below was entirely consistent 
with the Court's decision in Sierra Club" because this case is "significantly different." 
Aplee. Br., at 25. The difference, he argues, is that in Sierra Club both the emissions 
from the plant and the "specific, distinct and palpable injuries that would happen to them 
from those emissions" clearly existed. Id. at 25-26. Mclntyre emphasizes that the 
plaintiffs used the word "will" in their affidavits when asserting future harms {e.g., "the 
plant's emissions will impair his health", id. at 26), suggesting that such statements 
provided a level of certainty absent here. Id. at 26. But the distinction is illusory. Sierra 
Club was a summary judgment case whereas this case was dismissed on the pleadings. 
Thus, here the complaint (rather than affidavits) provides the operative facts. Yet it too 
repeatedly uses the word "will" in connection with the key injury and causation 
allegations. See, e.g., R. 4-5 (Mclntyre's bridge "will diminish the stream's ability to 
conduct high water flows and thereby increase the risk and danger of flooding" that will 
adversely affect the "surrounding stream environment"); at 5 (bridge "will alter the 
stream's channel, and thereby diminish the natural channel's ability to conduct high 
water flows, heighten the potential for damming, and thereby increase the risk of flooding 
in the surrounding areas"); at 6 ("The construction of a bridge in this environmentally 
fragile area will result in irreparable harm and damage to the Plaintiffs and their 
property.") (emphasis added). The controlling allegations here are no less direct than the 
affidavit statements in Sierra Club. 
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Mclntyre dismisses these allegations as mere speculation, but the same could 
easily be said of the affidavits in Sierra Club. Notwithstanding use of the word "will" in 
their affidavits, the plaintiffs there could not truly know whether future emissions from 
the power plant would actually harm their health. This Court rejected the requirement 
that the plaintiffs allege special susceptibility to those particular emissions. See Sierra 
Club, 2006 UT 74, ^ 29; Br. Apps., at 21. Standing arose from allegations of "potential 
harms" that were "particular to them," not from a high statistical likelihood that the 
potential harms would actually occur. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^ 24, 28. Indeed, 
standing in environmental litigation often rests on potential harms with minimal 
statistical probabilities and uncertain chains of causation. See, e.g., Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (1 in 200,000 risk of nonfatal 
skin cancer sufficient for standing in case challenging EPA rule). 
The primary defect of the decision below is that it fails to recognize that potential 
harms to persons or property - including harms that are neither "imminent" nor "certainly 
impending" (Op., ^j 15, 16) - can still give rise to standing. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 
74, ]f 29 ("If the emissions from the proposed power plant have the potential to harm the 
health of those persons who live in the area, we see no reason why those residents must 
actually develop a health problem before they have standing."). 
This Court's recent decision in CME v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 34, provides 
additional support for the Neighbors. CME sought approval from Tooele County to store 
low-level radioactive waste on its property but was denied. Id. ^ 2. After CME sold a 
portion of its property to neighboring landowner EnergySolutions, the county granted 
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EnergySolutions the permit it had denied CME. CME sued, but by the time of the appeal 
it was unclear whether CME even owned an interest in the property. Id. % 20. 
EnergySolutions moved for summary judgment arguing that CME lacked standing, which 
the trial court granted, "holding that CME lacked standing to challenge the County's 
decisions and that CME's claims were moot." Id. \ 6. 
On appeal, this Court reversed in an analysis that rejects high-threshold 
approaches to standing. The Court first explained that "[sjtanding is determined as of the 
time the action is brought." Id. ^ 8 (quotation marks and citation omitted). It then 
reaffirmed the holding in Sierra Club that where a party has a personal stake in the 
outcome as opposed to a generalized interest, potential injury alone is a sufficient 
"adverse effect" for standing: 
Recently this court described an adverse effect as an actual or potential 
injury that is "sufficiently particularized" to give a party a "personal stake 
in the outcome of the dispute." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 23 Yet, if 
the injury complained of is a general injury to the community, the party 
does not have a personal stake in the dispute, and thus, has not shown that it 
is adversely affected. Id. 
Id. \ 10; see also id. \ 13 ("potential harm to CME" sufficient for adverse impact; "To 
establish standing, an alleged harm can be actual or potential.") 
This Court also rebuffed the argument "that while CME alleged a particularized 
injury, it failed to prove the potential of such harm," since "[i]n most cases, a party must 
only allege an adverse effect to gain standing." Id. % 11 (emphasis added). For important 
procedural and judicial economy reasons, the same applies to allegations of causation: 
This court rarely imposes a requirement that a party prove its alleged 
harm, or even causation, to establish standing. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, % 
28 n. 3, % 32. This makes sense because "[sjtanding questions arise early in 
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the litigation, usually before discovery and the introduction of the 
evidence"; and to require a significant level of proof "would be unduly 
burdensome" because it would require "litigants to invest the time and 
money in gathering the evidence necessary to prove their claim only to be 
denied standing." Id. % 32. Thus, "[generally, the determination of 
whether a plaintiff has alleged a sufficient interest in order to satisfy the 
adverse impact part of the traditional test can be made on the face of the 
pleadings." Id., \ 28 n. 3. Only in rare cases is fact-finding required to 
assess a party's interest in a case. See id. . . . . [I]n Sierra Club, we found it 
sufficient that the plaintiffs lived and participated in outdoor recreation near 
the site of the plant that the Air Quality Board approved, and determined 
that they need not undertake fact-finding to establish their interest. Sierra 
Club, 2006 UT 74, ffif 22, 28 
Id. Tf 12 (emphasis added). 
Further, the Court rejected EnergySolutions' argument - analogous to Mclntyre's 
here - "that CME has not sufficiently shown that the potential harm it alleges was caused 
by the amendment of EnergySolutions' conditional use permit." Id. ^ 13. The Court 
reiterated that "to gain standing a party is not required to prove its interest or causation -
at least not to the extent required at trial." Id. Evidence of past injury to neighboring 
property "is sufficient to establish a more than speculative potential of future harm to 
neighboring properties." Id. 
Sierra Club and CME demonstrate this Court's firm resolve not to allow threshold 
questions of standing - which are designed simply to protect the separation of powers and 
limit lawsuits to real disputes between real people - to metastasize into the main focus of 
litigation. The wisdom of that approach is manifest here. This case is a prime example 
of the enormous waste of time and judicial and client resources that occurs when issues 
best resolved at the merits stage are instead transmogrified into questions of standing. 
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IV. MCINTYRE'S FUTURE ACTIONS CANNOT PRECLUDE STANDING. 
Lastly, Mclntyre makes much of his assertion that the bridge deck is removable. 
Aplee. Br., at 27-30. He claims that the risk the Neighbors allege is all the more remote 
because it assumes Mclntyre will not perform his duty to remove the deck when 
necessary to prevent flooding. In his view, the Neighbors ulack standing because the 
increased risk stems not from the Bridge, but from an independent act or omission by 
Mclntyre at some time in the indeterminate future." Aplee. Br., at 27. 
Mclntyre's frank admission that any future failure by him "to remove the Bridge's 
removable deck" as water backs up would constitute "an independent act of sheer 
recklessness" is duly noted. Id. But it has no effect on the standing analysis. Nothing in 
the case law - certainly nothing Mclntyre has cited - suggests that the Neighbors' 
standing to challenge the permit and the bridge should be contingent on speculations 
about what a defendant like Mclntyre might or might not do in the future. Flash floods 
and high-water events in canyon streams are inevitable but by nature unpredictable. Will 
Mclntyre never leave his home? Is he to sit on his crane 24/7 awaiting the next deluge? 
It would be odd indeed if a plaintiffs standing could be denied based on the assertion that 
the defendant himself was standing guard to make sure the threatened harm never 
occurred. That Mclntyre intends to remove the bridge when he deems it necessary is 
irrelevant to whether the Neighbors have standing. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Neighbors have standing under this Court's well-established jurisprudence. 
This Court should reverse the majority decision below and remand the case for further 
proceedings on the merits. 
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